Introduction
Since A Theory of Justice came up in 1971, the metaphor of the Original Position has brought up not only a nurturing debate but also enduring criticism. Rawls himself contended that the Original Position was merely an hypothetical expository device to build up a foundational environment where a fair agreement could be settled for the best principles of justice to obtain. He even took great pains to improve upon his basic arguments. However, as he humbly acknowledged many times, there remained unwieldy issues at the core of A Theory of Justice in need of further diligence.
We are going to claim in this monograph that Rawls laid a worthy groundwork for the Original Position by means of two major contributions: a) firstly, the rendering of "Justice as Fairness" as a political and not a metaphysical issue, carried out in his 1985 outstanding paper; b) secondly, the idea of Overlapping Consensus which, although he had already worked out in the 1985 paper, became fully developed in his influential book on Political Liberalism (1993).
Besides, our line of research will show that there are at least three underlying counterfactual conditionals in Rawls' conception that shape up the Original Position when we take advantage of his later notion of Overlapping Consensus. We feel that this has been a neglected issue so far. The analytical approach will evolve in stages.
The problem of justification and the considered judgments make the starting point, to be followed by the Original Position in section 2 where due attention is also paid to the dynamics of the reflective equilibrium.
Next, we expand on the Veil of Ignorance. Then, section 4 gives a brief outline of counterfactuals. It is for section 5 to cope with two hidden counterfactuals in the Original Position. Section 6 deals with the Overlapping Consensus, leaving for the following section the issue of how the Overlapping Consensus becomes functional to the Original Position by furnishing it with a third and complementary counterfactual.
Last of all, in section 8, an assessment of our proposal will proceed so that two well-known objections to the Original Position, namely those advanced by Nozick (1974) and Nagel (1973) , could be discussed in a new light against the background provided by the three counterfactuals.
The problem of justification and the considered judgments
The problem of justification arises when we have to look for a theory of justice that qualifies as the best among a set of alternative ones. The criterion of justification consists in assessing the extent to which such theory matches our considered judgments. Taking another standpoint, by considered judgments is understood a set of provisional moral evaluations conveying three features a) that they seem sound judgments b) and turn out to be fixed and basic facts c) to which the qualifying theory fits into.
We have underlined "provisional" since this issue will have a further enlargement in section 2.1, devoted to the so-called reflective equilibrium.
The Original Position
Since the concept of Justice as Fairness stems from the contractual tradition, it is likely to expect a fundamental agreement into which parties must enter so as to find out the principles of justice intended to rule and manage the evolvement of the basic structure of society. But in order for such an agreement to be fair, parties should be prevented from bargaining power to their advantage, or from building up procedures that might further their own agenda on behalf of opportunistic behavior or rent-seeking.
Rawls introduces both the original position of equality and the problem of justification because he is in search of a fair procedure of agreement on principles of justice: Justice, 1990 edition, pp. 15-16) .
Therefore, Rawls is not only interested in principles but he also proposes a methodology for deciding upon principles. Only after the principles are agreed on, parties make for a constitution and a legislature, and when this stage is reached we can say that they have contracted a general system of rules that defines a just society.
The choice problem involves the search of reasonable restrictions on the arguments that will lead to the principles of justice. As it is usual practice in rational choice, general actors are invested with distinctive features of behavior. Therefore, it is assumed that rational and free persons would manage their decision-making facing three sets of restrictions: a) On the players:
No person should be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural fortune or social circumstances in the choice of principles.
It should be impossible to tailor principles to the circumstances of one's own case.
Principles adopted should not be affected by particular inclinations and aspirations, and persons' conceptions of their good.
By person, Rawls means a fully cooperating actor in society over a complete life. In other words a fully-fledged citizen.
b) On the players' freedom:
all have the same rights in the procedure for choosing principles; each can make proposals, and submit reasons for their acceptance.
c) On the motivation of the players:
primary goods: it is asserted that people are better whenever their lives are endowed with more primary goods rather than less. In this context, by primary goods are meant things that rational men want. While dealing with the Original Position, we cannot forget that Justice as Fairness takes a firm stand on predicating that agreements will be feasible only if we give heed to:
i. the background institutions of the basic structure of society by which we must understand the main political, social and economic institutions;
ii. the framework provided by a modern constitutional democracy;
iii. the cooperative nature of social commitments
The Reflective Equilibrium
It would be misleading to assume that the Original Position is a fixed and permanent part of the agreement while deliberations are still going on. Quite the opposite: the principles of justice must be chosen in a competitive process that keeps the considered convictions as a countervailing standard. In other words, although the purpose of this expository device is to produce consented principles of justice, they should match considered convictions eventually. Let us outline this competitive practice.
a) The starting point is the setting of a choice context with restrictions by means of which it might follow a distinctive set of principles of justice to be regarded as the best available. Otherwise, we should be able to look for further conditions. b) By the same token, when defining such restrictions we have to bear in mind a set of considered convictions that are provisionally fixed and qualified to match those principles of justice that will come out of the initial deliberative process.
c) However, discrepancies may arise between the principles and the considered convictions. This calls for a dynamics of decision-making updating:
-either the intended original position qualifies for a change,
-or the existing judgments have to be revised.
d) Therefore, there is a dynamical approximation of considered convictions to the principles to be chosen, and this feedback process ends up when there is a balance between the former and the latter. Rawls calls this final state "reflective equilibrium":
reflective, because it refers to the principles that our considered convictions fit, and how they were derived; equilibrium, because, in the end, the principles and the judgments coincide.
e) Only when the reflective equilibrium has been reached, we can regard the Initial Position as a fully-fledged agreement.
Remark
Behind the reflective equilibrium we can find the same sort of adjustment of expectations that is current in competitive markets, or in usual arbitrage procedures widely used in Financial Economics.
The Veil of Ignorance
The Original Position is an hypothetical and non-historic contractual setting that gives heed to the background institutions of the basic structure of society. This being so, we need an objective point of view by which the position comes up as an agreement devoid of particular features lying on that institutional background. It goes without saying that bargaining power and contingencies from the past should not hinder an agreement on principles whose final task will be to regulate the institutions of the basic structure. It is for the Veil of Ignorance to correct for the arbitrariness of the world.
The Veil of Ignorance deprives the contracting parties of all those features that could prevent the basic agreement from holding outright: a) the parties do not know their place in society, neither his class position nor social status; b) they do not know their fortune, intelligence and strength; c) they do not know his conception of the good, their distinctive plans of life, aversion to risk or liability to pessimism or optimism; d) even they ignore the particular features of their society, or the generation to which they belong; e) but they certainly know not only that their society is subject to the circumstances of justice, but also the general facts about human society; they even know political affairs and principles of Economics, the basis of social organization and the laws of human psychology.
Taking the viewpoint of an economist or a decision-making theorist, one would say that the Veil of Ignorance consists in designing a very peculiar information set to hold for every party in the hypothetical deliberation process whose main characteristics are:
It is included in the common knowledge set of society Information is fully symmetrical and shared by everybody It is divested of the private information contained in the particular information set of each individual
Counterfactuals
The truth In ordinary applications the first and the second line are straightforward: if both sentences were true, it follows a true implication, whereas from a false consequent it must follow a false implication. However, lines three and four are rather puzzling. In fact, the falsity of the antecedent grants the truth of the conditional, regardless of the consequent being true or false.
Lines three and four are usually illustrated by means of counterfactual conditionals. Let us take a clear-cut example analyzed by Kearns (2000) discussing the subject and the role of possible worlds on Semantics' grounds. a) If kangaroos had no tails they would topple over. b) If kangaroos had no tails they would not topple over.
As kangaroos have tails, the antecedent in a) and b) is false, but if we see the table above, both a) and b) are true conditionals, in spite of being each consequent contradictory with the other. Still, there seems to be that only a) could pass the test of experience. The counterfactuals in examples a) and b) set forth a statement on hypothetical situations and never they intend to spell out how things take place in actual fact.
That is to say, counterfactuals claims about events that did not actually take place. In social sciences, counterfactuals are widely used for assessing causal hypothesis in non-experimental research settings. On the other hand, in the realm of the hard sciences, counterfactual are widely used as well. For instance, Galileo built up his dynamics upon the conception of a body moving without the influence of any external force, an event by all means implausible in real life.
From a political science standpoint, Fearon (1991) argued that when it is hypothesized that C was a cause of event E, and experimental testing and replication are not available, we have two strategies for empirically assessing this hypothesis:
either we can imagine that C had been absent and ask whether E would have or might have occurred in that counterfactual case;
or we can search for other actual cases that match the case under study except that C can be absent.
How to deal with counterfactuals? Still better, how can we isolate counterfactuals hidden in complex models? This has been a longstanding issue in Logic and Epistemology for many years hitherto. We have to bear in mind that almost everything concerned with conditionals is still at issue (Edgington, 1995) . Hence, to be on the safe side we follow one well-known approach suggested by Goodman (1947) in a widely referred paper where he brings forward that any counterfactual statement holds true if fulfills the following conditions:
i) the counterfactual antecedent, when joined with appropriate theories and facts, implies the consequent;
ii) the counterfactual antecedent is "cotenable" with the facts or "initial conditions" used to draw the inference. This means that if the antecedent had actually occurred, the initial conditions could also have occurred
Counterfactuals predicate a sort of connection between the antecedent and the consequent, holding true if the above mentioned connection obtains. But the consequent would usually not come up by logic alone unless we required joint statements to grant the connection.
In making this issue more precise, let S denote the set of statements linked with the relevant conditions. Then i) means:
Another feature of this approach is that S must not only be compatible with ( Antecedent ) but also jointly tenable ( or cotenable ) with ( Antecedent ). This latter feature is predicated by ii) and it could be summarized by
where it is not the case that S would not be true is A were.
Therefore, the framework that make meaningful any counterfactual conditional can be split down into two components: Both pairs of statements, I) and ii) on the one hand, a) and b) on the other hand, were stressed in bold because they will be conclusive below when the counterfactuals hidden in the Original Position will be brought to light.
Counterfactuals in the Original Position
Although Rawls did not make any counterfactual statement explicit, he was fully aware of the hypothetical reasoning behind the complex framework advanced in the Original Position. In his own words: In order to apply what we have said about counterfactuals we need to search not only for the constraints that parties entering into the original agreement must face, but also for the sets of statements linked with relevant conditions. They are of two kinds: core conditions and background conditions, and are detailed in Exhibit 2: a) Firstly, the core conditions are those that define the Original Position and were dealt with in section 2 and 3. For the sake of analysis, we are going to denote them this way:
First set of relevant conditions ( S 1 ): the defining features of the Original Position.
Second set of relevant conditions ( S 2 ): the constraints brought about on information by the Veil of Ignorance.
b) Secondly, the background conditions are those that Rawls explicitly expands on when putting forth a justification of the Original position.
Third set of relevant conditions ( S 3 ): those disclosed by the Circumstances of Justice; that is to say, the normal conditions under which human cooperation is both possible and necessary.
Exhibit 2 ESTRUCTURE OF THE UNDERLYING COUNTERFACTUAL IN THE ORIGINAL POSITION Primary Antecedent ( A )
If people were assumed to enter into agreement within a suitable environment called the Original Position
Primary Consequent ( C )
The first principles of justice would follow
First set of relevant conditions ( S 1 ) (they come from the Original Position)
No hypothetical person should be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural fortune or social circumstances in the choice of principles.
It should be impossible to tailor principles to the circumstances of one's own case. Principles adopted should not be affected by particular inclinations and aspirations, and persons' conceptions of their good.
Besides, it will be assumed that parties are equal in the broadest sense:
Second set of relevant conditions ( S 2 ) (they come from the Veil of Ignorance)
the parties do not know their place in society, his class position or social status; nor do they know their fortune, intelligence and strength; neither they know his conception of the good, their distinctive plans of life, aversion to risk or liability to pessimism or optimism; even they ignore the particular features of their society, or the generation to which they belong; but they certainly know not only that their society is subject to the circumstances of justice, but also the general facts about human society; they even know political affairs and principles of Economics, the basis of social organization and the laws of human psychology.
Third set of relevant conditions ( S 3 )
The Circumstances of Justice
Fourth set of relevant conditions ( S 4 )
The Justice, 1990 edition, page 340) For the overlapping consensus to become functional within the reasonable pluralism fostered by the democratic tradition, a reciprocity condition must be fulfilled: Such a conception must encompass familiar intuitive ideas and principles if we take advantage of a more basic albeit intuitive idea:
society is a system of fair cooperation between free and equal persons.
That is to say, the basic ideas of justice are common ground in the public culture of a democratic society.
In order to be acceptable, the political conception of Justice as Fairness meets the following constraints:
it is practical, not metaphysical or epistemological;
Exhibit 4 THE UNDERLYING COUNTERFACTUAL IN THE ORIGINAL POSITION WHEN THE OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS IS INCLUDED Basic Antecedent ( A )
Sixth set of relevant conditions ( S 6 )

OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS
The overlapping consensus is one in which different and even conflicting doctrines affirm the publicly shared basis for underwriting political arrangements. Hence, justice as fairness stems from the basic intuitive ideas that belong to the public culture of a constitutional democracy. In framing this political approach, it is our viewpoint that Rawls links political liberalism with the tradition of American Pragmatism, as this paragraph brings to light:
Philosophy as the search for truth about an independent metaphysical and moral order cannot, I believe, provide a workable and shared basis for a political conception of justice in a democratic society. (Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 1985, page 230) It should not come as a surprise that Rawls had turned out to be a bone of contention either for those who are for, or are against the latest branch of the Liberal tradition, labeled Pragmatic Liberalism [ background on this new development in Anderson (1990) ].
Moreover, it is also worthy of being remarked that leaving aside moral and philosophical controversies, as well as longstanding problems, Rawls reveals an Agnostic viewpoint that is consistent with classical liberal tenets inherited from the Enlightment tradition. In his own words: Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 1985, page 230) From these statements, we can say that parties who enter into the original position perform such thing as partners in the overlapping consensus venture. Besides, parties are rational, free, equal, and the overlapping consensus nurtures and makes meaningful the Veil of Ignorance that can be regarded like a common knowledge set with restrictions on particulars, history and contingencies. It is our contention that counterfactuals allow us to gain knowledge and intuition of the basic structure on which the device of the Original Position has been founded.
This form of constructivism neither asserts nor denies these doctrines. Rather, it recasts ideas from the tradition of the social contract to achieve a practicable conception of objectivity and justification founded on public agreement in judgment on due reflection. (Justice as
Shortly after the first edition of A Theory of Justice two outstanding scholars, Nozick and Nagel among many others, raised their concerns about the inner consistency of the Original Position. We want to take stock on their remarks not only due to their relevance but also because they could be met with the underlying counterfactuals. In this way, we hope that criticism will focus on some neglected but distinctive matters, helping to an enduring debate that should not be avoided as long as Rawls' work, far from definite or even being complete, it is widely acknowledged to have been a breakthrough in Political Science, nurturing research and better understanding of big issues that should sharpen up our own lives.
Let us handle, in turn, these strong objections, trying to give some further comment with the help of the counterfactuals and later Rawls' contributions to the debate. a) Nozick (1974) First of all, the context of the Original Position is one of counterfactuals, and this adds to nonhistorical environments. The truth or falsity of the Primary Counterfactual (see Exhibits 2 and 3) it does not depend on history, but on sets of relevant conditions in the wider background of possible worlds like those analyzed in Semantics (Kearns, 2000) and Logic (Nolt, 1986) .
Secondly, Nozick makes his point when hinting at the lack of initial entitlement, and the foregone conclusion: in that way some unfair situations could not be prevented. But the Tertiary Counterfactual (see Exhibit 4 and 5) conveys the Overlapping Consensus which could refrain participants entering the hypothetical agreement from claiming for their particular special entitlements, as long as the agreement upon principles of justice evolves. It would be as if entitlements were "put into brackets", like frictions in Newtonian Mechanics, or transaction costs in perfectly competitive markets. As soons as the principles are chosen, entitlements could be resumed in the context of justice as fairness (so cleverly criticized by Nozick) while the distributive approach to justice could obtain eventually, and even contest with Nozick´s approach which is not free from criticism, by far. b) Nagel (1973) put forth the weakness in the epistemology of the Original Position under this format:
Any hypothetical choice situation which requires agreement among the parties will have to impose strong restrictions on the grounds of choice, and these restrictions can be justified only in terms of a conception of the good. It is one of those cases in which there is no neutrality to be had, because neutrality needs as much justification as any other position. (Rawls on Justice, page 227) Although Nagel's perspicacious comment is straightforward, Rawls shifted gears as from his paper Justice as Fairness: Political not metaphysical was published, claiming that he only attempted to work on the surface, leaving aside comprehensive conceptions of justice, metaphysical concerns and moral or religious debates. Moreover, the Overlapping Consensus acknowledged the irresolvable conflict of non-neutrality and submitted a pragmatic criterion to cope with that conflict.
If we take into account how the tertiary counterfactual interplays with the primary and secondary ones, this new perspective brings more light over the framework that is embedded into the Original Position. It seems that the former mindset, however worthwhile it had been, prevented the analysis from sound lateral thinking.
CONCLUSIONS
The considered judgments and the reflective equilibrium provide with a procedural knowledge set that allows for competitive partnerships among all participants in the Initial Position. It seems advisable to regard this procedural set as one with background conditions to fulfill counterfactuals eventually.
The Original Position discloses a complex methodological structure and admits of the following features:
¡ there is a primary counterfactual whose antecedent is cotenable with two sets of relevant conditions, namely S 1 that shapes the minimal constraints for the Initial Position to hold operationally, and S 2 the formal constraints in the knowledge set of participants (also called the Veil of Ignorance); ¡ there is a secondary counterfactual whose antecedent is cotenable with S 2 and S 4 (the set of the formal constraints of the concept of right); ¡ both the primary and secondary counterfactuals are logically connected by a material implication.
Finally, the Overlapping Consensus boils down to a complex framework that stems from the following features: ¡ there is a tertiary counterfactual whose antecedent is cotenable with S 5 (whose contents shape the Overlapping Consensus) and S 6 (whose contents exhibit Considered Judgments and the Reflective Equilibrium) ¡ both the primary and tertiary counterfactuals are logically connected by a material implication.
With the help of counterfactuals we can understand much better what the Original Position involves to the extent of logical linkage and descriptive scope. By no means they allow for proving the factual truth or material realization of the Primary Counterfactual, because a heuristically decisionmaking device should not be misconceived as an explanation.
